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Previous literature on open source software (OSS) mostly analyzes organizational issues within communities of devel-opers and users. This paper focuses on for-profit organizations that release software products under OSS licenses, and
argues that variations in their endowments of intellectual property rights, namely patents and trademarks, help to deter-
mine which firms will tend to incorporate OSS into commercial products. We explain whether and under what conditions
preexisting stocks of intellectual property rights can be useful complementary assets that allow firms to benefit directly or
indirectly from commercializing OSS products, and test our hypotheses on a novel data set built on firms’ announcements
of OSS product releases in the specialized press between 1995 and 2003. We find three robust results: (a) firms with large
stocks of software patents are more likely to release OSS products; (b) firms with large stocks of software trademarks are
less likely to release OSS products; (c) firms with large stocks of hardware trademarks are more likely to release OSS
products.
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Introduction
Not only is open source software (OSS) currently gain-
ing strength as a development process (Lerner and Tirole
2002), but it is also attracting increasing commercial
interest among firms. The best known examples are
IBM, Sun Microsystems, and Oracle, all of which have
started to invest in and legitimize the use of Linux for
enterprise applications (Koenig 2004). In the first quar-
ter of 2005, Novell realized Linux-related product rev-
enues of $44 million USD, which accounted for 15% of
its total sales in that period (eWeek 2005). Other firms,
such as Red Hat and SCO Group, have specialized as
OSS distributors, aggregating, integrating, and optimiz-
ing the newest software codes available from the OSS
community.
Firms’ increasing commercial interest in OSS con-
stitutes an empirical puzzle insofar as it defies the
traditional wisdom holding that a weak regime of appro-
priability seriously undermines firm incentives to release
new products (Teece 1986). Thus, why do for-profit
firms engage in the commercialization of OSS products?
This article argues that firms can profit from their invest-
ment in OSS by relying on the control of complementary
resources, and that the heterogeneity in the distribution
of such resources explains why some firms take more
OSS commercial actions than others.
OSS characteristics contrast sharply with the stan-
dard model for proprietary software, whereby innovative
firms conceal their source code and use licenses to
deprive users of the ability to share and modify the orig-
inal software (Dam 1995). Instead, at the heart of any
current OSS product there is a license that both waives
the principal rights assigned to the software creator by
copyright law and grants users the right to access, mod-
ify, and redistribute the source code.1 Software code
that is revealed as OSS then becomes freely available,
increasing the likelihood of imitation and substantially
reducing the releasing firm’s lead time and competitive
advantage.
To be sure, firms can use different mechanisms to boost
the appropriability of OSS products. For example, they
can combine an OSS with a proprietary license (Hecker
1999, Henkel 2006). Alternatively, they can use tradi-
tional protection mechanisms such as legal rights and
secrecy on at least part of the software, or even build
an exclusive relationship with a committed developer
community (Dahlander and Magnusson 2005). These
alternative protection mechanisms notwithstanding, it is
indisputable that OSS significantly reduces the level of
code secrecy compared with proprietary software.
Our theoretical analysis starts with the observation
that, over the last decade, OSS has reemerged as a
mode for developing and organizing software innova-
tion. Firms can respond to such a change in the software
development process in different ways: by adjusting to,
resisting, or supporting it. The other essential element
of our analysis is the sensible reduction of the level
of protection of the core product, which forces firms
to secure the control of other, possibly complementary,
resources to benefit from their commercialization efforts
(Teece 1986). Several scholars point out how preexisting
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assets, when protected and difficult to imitate, drive a
firm’s initial competitive position and affect its ability to
adapt and exploit new opportunities (Tripsas 1997, King
and Tucci 2002). Protected assets can be considered
nonsubstitutable and costly to imitate resources (Barney
1991), meaning that variations in such protected assets
could explain a large part of the differences in OSS
commercialization strategies across firms. Specifically,
we focus on the stocks of patents and trademarks that
firms have accumulated before commercializing their
first OSS product. These represent protected assets that
are almost exogenous to the new conditions because
they have been gathered under the proprietary software
paradigm. We investigate whether and why the endow-
ments of these property rights are (or are not) comple-
mentary to the OSS, which is the intellectual property
in need of protection.
In this context, we formulate the following four
research hypotheses: (a) firms with large stocks of soft-
ware patents are more likely to release OSS products;
(b) firms with large stocks of software trademarks are
less likely to release OSS products; (c) firms with large
stocks of hardware trademarks are more likely to release
OSS products; (d) firms with large stocks of hardware
patents are more likely to release OSS products.
We test these arguments by providing an econometric
analysis on a unique data set of the commercialization
of OSS products by for-profit firms. Our sample, built
on the announcements of product introductions in the
specialized press, tracks down all OSS product releases
by firms from 1995 to 2003 in the two major software
niches: operating systems and applications. This repre-
sents a novel data set that is both systematic and com-
prehensive. We use a count data model on the number
of OSS product releases to test our hypotheses.
There is a fairly recent but growing body of litera-
ture on OSS. Previous academic research in organiza-
tion and economics focuses mainly on understanding the
motivations behind the participation of individual agents
within the collective development process, their over-
all incentive structure, the allocation of rewards within
OSS projects, and the sustainability of such a model
for innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003, Shah
2006, Roberts et al. 2006, O’Mahony 2003, O’Mahony
and Ferraro 2007, Gambardella and Hall 2006). Tradi-
tionally, OSS has been considered a bottom-up move-
ment, where most of the significant activity takes place
in Internet-based communities of independent develop-
ers who collaborate with each other in creating software
that they, or their organizations, need. As a consequence,
both the theory and the empirical evidence on firms’
commercialization of OSS products are scant. Although
on von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) argue that the free
disclosure of source code limits direct paths to profiting
from OSS products for commercial firms, they recog-
nize that firms may still find indirect ways to appropri-
ate the returns from investments in OSS. For example,
firms may benefit from patronizing OSS programs if
these complement proprietary software or hardware that
they already sell. Other authors emphasize that appro-
priability might not be firms’ main concern if network
externalities are important. OSS could increase the speed
of diffusion of a given standard, and firms could then
benefit by exploiting products that are complementary
to that standard. Recent research based on survey data
provides empirical evidence on the latter point (Henkel
2006, Gruber and Henkel 2006, Bonaccorsi et al. 2006).
We contribute to this literature first by offering, to the
best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive data on
commercialization patterns in OSS, and second by pro-
viding a framework for understanding whether preexist-
ing stocks of intellectual property rights can (or cannot)
be useful complementary assets that allow firms to ben-
efit directly or indirectly from using OSS code in com-
mercial products.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 explains the theoretical framework on which our
main hypotheses are based. Section 3 describes the
data and the construction of the sample, the empirical
methodology, and the variables used in the estimations.
Section 4 shows the results, and §5 concludes with a
discussion of the implications of our findings, some pos-
sible avenues for future research, and some of the limi-
tations of this work.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Our premise is that preexisting assets affect the direction
as well as the pace of change and adaptation of a firm
(Tripsas 1997, King and Tucci 2002). Compared with
proprietary software, OSS entails important differences
in the way products are developed. Firms might respond
to such a change in the software development process
in different ways: by adjusting, resisting, or supporting
it. Thus, following the resource-based theory tradition,
we investigate how heterogeneity in preexisting resource
endowments among firms leads to variations in their
response to a changing environment (Barney 1991)—in
this case, differences in their efforts to commercialize
OSS products.
We argued in the introduction that a salient difference
between the OSS paradigm and the proprietary software
paradigm is the level of protection of intellectual prop-
erty, which is relatively lower in the former. Under the
OSS paradigm, protection of software products through
source-code secrecy is seriously undermined.
As the seminal work of Teece (1986) illustrated, when
legal protection of intellectual property is weak, firms
must rely on the control of complementary assets to
profit from their product innovation efforts. To confer
an advantage, such assets must be difficult for potential
competitors to replicate. That is, even if the new product
is easy to imitate, the bundle made up of the new prod-
uct and the complementary assets must not be. We focus
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our analysis on the protected intellectual property that
a firm has accumulated before the advent of the OSS
paradigm, which, by definition, is not easily imitable.
Because such protected intellectual property has been
accumulated under the proprietary software paradigm,
it is not clear a priori that it can be leveraged into
the OSS paradigm. These assets are the result of sev-
eral factors, including initial endowments, organizational
learning, and path dependence, which are mostly exoge-
nous to the new conditions (Dosi 1988). Hence, pre-
existing assets could be complementary and thus drive
a favorable initial competitive position for the firm, or
they could be antonymous and seriously undermine the
efficacy of adaptation (i.e., by generating organizational
rigidities, as in Gatignon et al. 2002). Specifically, we
consider two types of intellectual property protection,
namely, patents and trademarks.
Patents are legal titles granting owners the exclusive
right to make commercial use of their innovation and the
enforcement power to prevent others from using it or to
set the terms on which it can be exploited. Firms file
patents to secure legal protection of their inventions—
for instance, a new product—although patents also serve
other purposes such as blocking rivals’ research, prevent-
ing suits, reinforcing bargaining power in cross-licens-
ing negotiations, sustaining technology transactions, etc.
(Cohen et al. 2000, Ziedonis 2004).
In the software industry, a patent usually protects an
algorithm, that is, a series of step-by-step procedures that
are necessary to perform a task. If there are mathemati-
cal procedures beyond the algorithm, they are protected,
too. Although software patents were granted in the
United States before 1994, only after that date, thanks
to a court decision, did software inventions become
patentable per se and not only in conjunction with hard-
ware inventions, so that any real difference between the
treatment of software and that of other inventions was
essentially eliminated by the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO). The number of software patent
applications increased dramatically after 1994. This has
generated an intense debate between detractors and
advocates of software patentability (see, for instance,
Hall and MacGarvie 2006), which falls outside the scope
of this paper. What matters for our argument is that
firms differ in their stocks of software patents before
they make inroads into commercializing OSS products.
Trademarks are combinations of “words, phrases,
symbols, or designs that identify and distinguish the
source of the goods or services” (USPTO Documenta-
tion, http://tess.uspto.gov). Firms can register as a trade-
mark a new name, a jingle or a slogan, a new image, or
a logo (e.g., “don’t leave home without it”). In this way,
they secure legal protection of their investment in mar-
keting, reputation for quality, brand names, and distribu-
tion channels. Even if trademarks do not protect against
the imitation of the product per se, they do help to boost
appropriability by securing control of these complemen-
tary assets.
Trademarks can protect not only the name and the
logo of a product, but also promotions. “Pleasure for
Windows,” “Smarter Retailing,” and “Global Access
to Local Knowledge” are all trademarks registered by
Microsoft. It is also common to protect the product name
with several logos that differ in shape, design, and color.
For example, by the year 2003, seven live trademarks
protected the name of Nintendo’s classic video game
“Super Mario Bros.” The great importance of trademarks
in the software industry is exemplified by the court bat-
tle that Microsoft waged against Lindows.com for the
use of the trademark “Lindows,” which—according to
Microsoft—infringed on several Microsoft trademarks.
The court not only agreed to prohibit the use of that
trademark, but also assigned a penalty of about $400,000
USD to Lindows.com (PR Newswire 2003). Trademark
owners pay different types of fees for each class of
goods or services for which a trademark is registered,
and they have to prove periodically that they are using
the trademark in the relevant market; even if the owner
is willing to pay the fees, a trademark is cancelled if it
is not commercially used for five consecutive years after
registration.
Whereas patents have received great attention in both
management and economics literature, academic interest
in trademarks has only recently emerged. Previous stud-
ies show that trademarks represent a good proxy for the
products and markets in which a firm operates, and that
they are correlated with sales and stock market value
(Seethamraju 2003, Smith and Parr 2000).
Below, we explore how preexisting stocks of patents
and trademarks affect efforts at commercializing OSS
products.
Software Patents
We highlight three reasons that help explain why a large
portfolio of software patents can be a complementary
asset that favors the commercialization of OSS products.
The first reason is the potential complementarity
between patented software and OSS products. Arora
(1995) demonstrates that firms can still extract rents
from the transfer of know-how that is easily imi-
table—avoiding moral hazard and transaction cost pro-
blems—provided that such know-how is bundled with
complementary knowledge that is well protected. There-
fore, firms with large repositories of patented soft-
ware algorithms have more chances to extract rents
from OSS products by controlling complementary assets
(Teece 1986). Some firms enclose in the transaction
the payment of a royalty over the patented technology
together with the services sold on top of the OSS prod-
uct. A good example of this strategy is Squeezebox,
an MP3 player. The server software that controls the
device, SlimServer, is released under the common OSS
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general public license (GPL) and has been developed
with the contribution of a worldwide open source com-
munity. However, it is necessary to have a series of extra
codecs installed to play back most audio formats, which
are patent protected and not included in the standard
installation (Personal Computer World 2006).
The second reason is strategic and relates to the possi-
bility of controlling the development of an OSS project.
Mann (2006) highlights how firms with software patents
can direct the evolution of an OSS project in two ways.
First, by threatening or exercising enforcement rights,
they can make it prohibitively difficult for new contribu-
tors to obtain patents that write onto related knowledge.
Second, they can discourage those contributions that pur-
sue a deployment of the project that is too distant from
the aims of the firm. For example, in workstations, Sun
Microsystems controls the evolution of the Solaris open
project, building a dense fence of patented technologies
around it. Greater control over an OSS project enhances
appropriability and thus reduces the costs of making the
source code open. As a side effect, however, tight con-
trol of the OSS project might discourage participation
of independent developers (Shah 2006) and could be
detrimental, especially when projects are in their ini-
tial stages and require substantial contributions from the
community.
The third reason is defensive. When a firm releases
an OSS product that bundles several, sometimes dis-
persed, contributions, it is likely at risk of infringing
on some patents held by other entities. However, the
wider a firm’s patent portfolio, the stronger its bargain-
ing power, and the higher its chance to avoid litigation
or to establish friendly agreements with potential litiga-
tors. For example, in semiconductors, Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) and Ziedonis (2004) show that when the markets
for technologies are fragmented, large patent portfolios
help firms lower transaction costs and resolve hold-up
problems through the use of cross-licensing agreements.
Thus, our first hypothesis is
Hypothesis 1. The larger a firm’s preexisting stock
of software patents, the more likely it is to build OSS
into its commercial software products.
Software Trademarks
Firms with large stocks of software trademarks have in-
vested heavily to protect their marketing efforts, brands,
reputation for quality, and distribution channels. This
investment is tailored to the proprietary software para-
digm, and we argue that it cannot be easily leveraged
into OSS.
As Mitchell and Singh (1992) have argued, the fear of
product cannibalization prevents firms from investing in
emerging and new markets. Typically, profits from new
products are uncertain, and a firm is relatively unwilling
to jeopardize existing, stable income streams by making
risky investments (Conner 1998). The industrial orga-
nization tradition predicts that an incumbent has fewer
incentives to introduce new products because they erode
profits in existing lines of business (Ghemawat 1991).
Thus, the cannibalization effect due to the commercial-
ization of OSS products is likely to be greater for those
firms with larger stakes in proprietary software.
Moreover, a firm that has established and protected
a reputation in proprietary software has done so to in-
crease the consumer’s willingness to pay a premium
for quality, reliability, and brand name. It therefore
has an interest in emphasizing the costs of switching
brands. OSS requires a quite different strategic posi-
tioning. First, many customers/consumers of OSS prod-
ucts are more cost conscious (Von Hippel and Von
Krogh 2003). Second, OSS products tend to be priced
much lower than equivalent proprietary products. Simul-
taneously offering products with a different positioning
inside a unique brand strategy might lead to cannibaliz-
ing investment in proprietary software brand names and
reputation (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001).
In principle, a strong brand name or reputation for
quality can be an intangible asset that is not easily imi-
table and is exploitable in other domains. Software trade-
marks could be complementary to OSS products and
could boost their appropriability, much as patents do.
However, unlike patented technologies, the successful
transfer of existing trademarks into a different context
greatly depends on the customers’ reaction. Firms rely
heavily on brand investments to convince the consumer
that their products are superior to those of competi-
tors. Usually this occurs in market niches in which a
variety of products with similar performances are avail-
able. Under these circumstances, entering OSS might be
harmful because it might suggest to the consumer that
competing products are nearly identical.
Thus, firms with large software trademark portfolios
will be more likely to adopt wait-and-see strategies.
Hypothesis 2. The larger a firm’s preexisting stock
of software trademarks, the less likely it is to build OSS
into its commercial software products.
Hardware Trademarks
Although proprietary software and OSS can, broadly
speaking, be considered alternatives, either open source
or proprietary software is complementary to the hard-
ware, that is, the machine on which the software runs. If
hardware and software are characterized collectively as
a value chain, then commoditizing those portions of the
chain in which the company does not have a core com-
petence helps earn higher returns from those portions
of the chain in which it can compete. Firms that have
invested heavily in establishing a brand name and repu-
tation for quality in hardware will benefit if OSS either
reduces software production costs (in case the firm typ-
ically develops in-house the software for its machines)
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or minimizes hold-up from software suppliers (in case
the firm typically outsources software production).
The costs of assembling an OSS product are much
lower than those of developing new software from
scratch (Samuelson 2006). Firms can combine various
available OSS modules at only a fraction of the cost
of developing ex novo equivalent proprietary modules
(Economist 2005). Von Krogh et al. (2005) find software
reuse quite common among 15 OSS projects; Spaeth
et al. (2006) show that, in the OSS Debian project, soft-
ware reuse follows a power law distribution, with some
software chunks intensively reused. OSS also opens up
the opportunity for reducing the bargaining power of
specialized suppliers of proprietary software by offer-
ing a cheaper and more customizable alternative to their
products. Firms with large stocks of hardware trade-
marks therefore have an incentive for backing OSS ini-
tiatives from which they will eventually benefit as a
result of complementarity. Industry jargon refers to this
as patronizing strategy.
It is also worth noting that firms with a strong brand
name and reputation in hardware are less concerned
about protecting their software. First, if software is used
simply to make hardware machines operative, such firms
prefer OSS because by making the source code public
they are relieved of the burden of servicing and updat-
ing the software. Second, when the OSS solution is
customized to the machine, imitation of the software
program becomes more difficult because the process of
customization entails a great deal of tacit and nonob-
servable knowledge.
These arguments lead to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. The larger a firm’s preexisting stock
of hardware trademarks, the more likely it is to build
OSS into its commercial software products.
Hardware Patents
The arguments supporting Hypothesis 3 apply almost
directly to a firm’s stock of hardware patents. Firms that
have invested in protecting their hardware technology
benefit from the commoditization of software due to the
presence of potential complementarities between hard-
ware and software knowledge bases. In addition, as dis-
cussed in Hypothesis 1, firms can better profit from their
OSS products by exploiting the complementarity with
the hardware on which they exert greater legal control
through patents (Arora 1995).
Thus, our last hypothesis is
Hypothesis 4. The larger a firm’s preexisting stock
of hardware patents, the more likely it is to build OSS
into its commercial software products.
Data and Methodology
Sample Construction
Our sample is composed of all the firms that announced
through the specialized press the introduction of a soft-
ware package based on an OSS license between 1980 and
2003. We select our data from the databases Infotrac’s
General Business File ASAP and PROMT, by searching
for press articles that report a “product announcement,” a
“new software release,” or a “software evaluation” in the
software sector (Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
code 7372) and that contain in their text the words “open
source” or “Linux.”2 After reading the text of each article,
we select only those events that clearly refer to a product
that is described in the article as being “open source,”
theoretically excluding all proprietary software products
running on OSS platforms. We then extract from each
article the name of the company and the date of product
introduction (month and year). We find that the first com-
mercial announcement of an OSS product was in May
1995. We cannot measure directly the level of vaporware
in our product introduction notifications—a well known
limitation in news event data—but we believe that the
high integrity of the journals from which the announce-
ments are collected limits the likelihood of its presence
in our data (eWeek, Computer Reseller News, Electronic
Engineering Times, and PC Magazine account for more
than 70% of the announcements). In addition, 65% of
the selected articles also contain a product evaluation,
which implies that the journal’s reviewer has at least
seen the product prototype. Our robustness checks show
that focusing only on these articles does not qualita-
tively change our findings. Although we do not have
precise information about the type of license that is
used for each product, we can identify all products
described in the articles as open source and Linux-based.
Such products are licensed under the GNU-GPL scheme,
which imposes the burden of reciprocity, i.e., the source
code of derived work must be made available to all
receivers of the software. Note that these products rep-
resent more than 80% of our whole sample of com-
mercially released OSS products. We take this feature
into consideration when we perform some robustness
checks.
Using the SIC codes reported in the articles, we divide
the OSS products into two main niches: operating sys-
tems (OPSYS; SIC codes 737261 and 737250) and ap-
plications (APP; six digit SIC codes beginning with
7372, other than -61 and -50). When the SIC code is
not available at six digits, we analyze the text of the
article to distinguish between the two niches. The liter-
ature provides evidence of potential differences between
these niches in the factors that drive product releases
and determine their success. For operating systems, these
factors are the strength of network externalities and
their performance on hardware; for applications, they
Fosfuri, Giarratana, and Luzzi: The Commercialization of OSS Products
Organization Science 19(2), pp. 292–305, © 2008 INFORMS 297
Table 1 Distribution of Firms and OSS Product Releases from 1995 to 2003 by Sector of Core Activity
OPSYS APP
Number of Av. size Number of Number of Av. size Number of
firms (employees) products firms (employees) products
Electronics 13 42827 17 7 34840 7
Hardware 77 11390 286 30 24985 83
Software 195 1155 490 154 1368 236
Semiconductors 18 9451 61 2 39434 5
Telecommunications 12 13185 17 11 31458 19
Other 5 283190 6 9 6586 10
Total 320 213
Number of products 877 360
Source. Our elaborations are from Infotrac’s General Business File ASAP and PROMT databases and from Bureau
van Dijk’s Icarus, Amadeus, and Jade databases.
are the features of the products, the marketing approach,
and the speed of customer learning-by-using (Torrisi
1998). Moreover, earlier studies of the software industry
(Gandal et al. 1999) demonstrate that the diffusion of
an operating system standard is intrinsically associated
with the availability of a large portfolio of applications
that could be run on that software base.
We check for the group structure of our firms by using
information from the Business and Company Resource
Center database, Gale Group’s Infotrac. We end up with
213 different entries in APP, which account for 360
different products, and 320 entries in OPSYS, which
account for 877 products. Because 72 firms entered
both niches, the total number of entrants in the OSS
market is 461. All company data used in our analysis
are obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s databases Icarus,
Amadeus, and Jade for American, European, and Asian
firms, respectively. Table 1 shows the distribution and
average size of the firms in our sample by core sector of
activity. Note that 85% of the firms that introduced OSS
products in OPSYS (and 86% of those that introduced
OSS products in APP) are either software or hardware
firms, and that these firms account for 88% of OSS prod-
uct releases in OPSYS (and 89% in APP).
Estimation Procedure and Dependent Variable
We estimate a count data model where the dependent
variable is the number of new OSS products (or new ver-
sions of already launched OSS products) announced by
a firm from the date of its first OSS product release until
December 2003. We believe this variable captures well
the efforts a firm makes to build OSS into its commercial
software products. Moreover, the literature has suggested
that in a system with free disclosure of technical knowl-
edge, such as OSS, firms must continually introduce new
products or new updated versions to survive and gain a
competitive advantage (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993).
Table 2 shows the distribution of the number of OSS
product introductions along with the average presence
of a firm in the market (in months) for groups of firms
classified by the number of products they introduced.
Of the firms, 36% in OPSYS and 21% in APP released
more than one product before December 2003. Most of
the multirelease firms introduced, on average, one prod-
uct per year. Among firms with more than one release,
17.3% of those in OPSYS released between 2 and 12,
and 22.2% of those in APP released between 2 and 6. It
is worth noting that the majority of those firms that had
introduced only one product were late entrants in the
market (about three years of presence on average in both
niches). Accordingly, as we report in the control vari-
ables section, we introduce into our estimations a firm’s
duration of presence in the OSS market.
We hypothesize that the number of OSS product
releases is generated by the function y = f x,
where y is product count, x is the set of explanatory vari-
ables, and  is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
One econometric challenge is in the fact that our sam-
ple is not randomly selected because we observe only
those firms that have introduced at least one OSS prod-
uct during the period under scrutiny. Thus, we cannot
directly use the Poisson (or negative binomial) model
for count data, and we need to run an estimation proce-
dure that incorporates the correction for the no-release
observations. We therefore use a procedure based on
Table 2 Distribution of the Number of OSS Product Releases
by Firms
OPSYS APP
Number of Number Months on Number Months on
products of firms % the market of firms % the market
1 205 0.641 35 168 0.789 39
2–5 90 0.281 45 38 0.178 47
6–10 14 0.044 51 3 0.014 53
11–25 6 0.019 62 3 0.014 56
>25 5 0.016 69 1 0.005 59
Source. Our elaborations are from Infotrac’s General Business File
ASAP and PROMT databases.
Notes. The mean of months on the market has been computed
as the mean of the number of months between firm entry (month,
year) and December 2003, where entry refers to a firm’s first OSS
product introduction.
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Terza (1998), who shows how the number of product in-
troductions conditional on a selection equation can be
estimated by nonlinear least squares, even if the actual
conditional distribution is unknown.
We build a sample of firms that did not release OSS
products during the period under study. These firms are
randomly selected using as matching criteria the precise
country (Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, and
so on) and sector (three digit SIC code) composition of
the original sample, so that the total dimension of the
original sample is replicated for the no-release sample
in both APP and OPSYS. We again use the databases
Icarus, Amadeus, and Jade to select these firms.
Considering both the firms in the original sample and
the no-release firms, we assume that the observed num-
ber of product introductions yi follows a Poisson distri-
bution conditional on a normally distributed error term
yi  	i ∼ Poisson
i, so that its log-conditional mean can
be modeled as a linear function of our covariates and
controls, xi, plus the error term 	i ∼N02:
lnEyi  xi 	i= ln
i  	i = ′xi + 	i
The normal error term in this specification allows us to
take into account unobserved heterogeneity, which is not
modeled in the standard Poisson specification where the
mean of yi is equal to the variance and all of the hetero-
geneity is accounted for in the vector of covariates xi.
3
The estimation procedure is then run in two steps,
where the former models a sample selection equation
and the latter models the mean of the number of product
introductions conditional on at least one product intro-
duction. We address the first-step estimation through a
Probit specification, where the dependent variable is a
dummy equal to 1 if a firm has introduced an OSS prod-
uct and 0 otherwise (di = 1 if z∗i = ′wi + ui ≥ 0 ui ∼
N01. Given the first-step estimation of the parame-
ters , the mean of the number of product introductions
conditional on a product release di = 1 can be speci-
fied as (Terza 1998)
Eyi xidi=1=exp0+1x1i+···
(
′wi+
′wi
)

where  is the cumulative function of a standard-
ized normal distribution, the constant term 0 is equal
to 0+2/2, and  is the covariance of the bivari-
ate normal distribution of the two error terms 	i ui,
=  . Even if the actual distribution of yi  xidi = 1
is unknown, the parameters  and  in the conditional
mean function of the second step can be estimated by
nonlinear least squares.
Because 	′wi is used in place of the unobserved
′wi in the estimates of the second step, the asymptotic
covariance matrix for the two-step estimator must be
adjusted after estimation. We use a consistent estimator
for the asymptotic covariance matrix based on Murphy
and Topel (1985) (see Green 2000, chap. 20).
Main Independent Variables: Patents and
Trademarks
Software and Hardware Patents. We count the num-
ber of unexpired software and hardware patents granted
to a given firm up to the month of the announcement
of its first OSS product. We download patents data from
the USPTO database available at http://tess.uspto.gov. To
distinguish between software and hardware patents, we
apply search algorithms to the front page of the patent
(see the appendix for a detailed explanation of these
search algorithms). We label these variables patentsoft-
ware and patenthardware.
Software and Hardware Trademarks. Like patents re-
cords, trademarks data are downloaded from the USPTO
database available at http://tess.uspto.gov. To distinguish
between software and hardware trademarks, we apply to
the front page of the trademark search algorithms anal-
ogous to those applied to patents (see the appendix).
We then create two variables: trademarksoftware and
trademarkhardware, the preentry number of live USPTO
trademarks in software and in hardware, respectively,
filed by a firm up to the month before its first OSS prod-
uct announcement.
Note that firms display important heterogeneity in
their stocks of patents and trademarks, which suggests
that these measures capture two different aspects of a
firm’s preentry position. Thus, it is not uncommon that
a firm with a large stock of software trademarks has
only few software patents granted by the USPTO or
vice versa. For example, Oracle, Cisco Systems, and
Computer Associates have trademark–patent ratios of
2, 3, and 27, respectively. Conversely, IBM’s patent–
trademark ratio is approximately 6. At the sector level,
hardware and semiconductor firms have a higher propen-
sity to patent software than to file software trademarks.
Software firms show a higher propensity to file software
trademarks than to patent. Details are available from the
authors upon request.
Controls
We include a set of controls in our estimations. First, we
control for firm size and age, where size is measured as
the logarithm of the number of employees in the year of
the announcement of the first OSS product and age is
proxied by three period dummies that are equal to 1 if
the founding year of a firm is between 1976 and 1985
(age76–85), between 1986 and 1994 (age86–94), and
after 1995 (age95). The baseline is a firm founded before
1976. These time breaks broadly correspond to the main
development eras in the computer industry (workstation,
personal computer, open source software). Size and age
are standard controls in the entry and survival literature,
and can be interpreted as proxies for a firm’s scale and
experience. We also control for the degree of firm diver-
sification in the year of the announcement of the first
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OSS product. We measure this by a Herfindahl index
calculated over the total stock of a firm’s trademarks
distributed across the 11 different classes of the USPTO
International Classification of Goods and Services. Note
that the higher the index, the less diversified the firm.
Thus, we call this variable specialization.
Second, given that we run separate estimations for the
two niches (APP and OPSYS), and that 72 firms have
announced product introductions in both of them, we
control for the fact that firms that have already entered
one niche may have a significantly different number of
OSS releases in the other. Therefore, when we run our
estimations for OPSYS, we introduce a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if a firm has introduced a software
application before (and not after) its first operating sys-
tem introduction, and zero otherwise (anteapplication).
Similarly, in the estimations for APP niche, we create
the dummy variable anteopsystem, which is equal to 1 if
a firm has introduced an operating system product before
(and not after) its first introduction of an application.
The relevance of these control dummies is suggested by
previous studies that find positive and strong feedbacks
between applications and operating systems. Comparing
DOS and CP/M products, Gandal et al. (1999) highlight
that applications make operating systems more valuable
and vice versa. These findings suggest that a firm that
has entered into both niches could benefit from some
sort of advantage in releasing new software products.
Third, a potential concern about the use of stocks of
patents and trademarks is that there is significant hetero-
geneity in patent and trademark propensity across dif-
ferent sectors, as we also pointed out above. Software
firms, for instance, have traditionally patented less than
other firms in part because software per se could not
be patented before 1994. Thus, our core variables might
capture a sector effect rather than a firm effect. We take
this into account by introducing five sector dummies:
hardware (SIC code 357), software (737), electronics
(36 except for 367 and 366), semiconductors (367), and
telecommunications (366). In addition, we introduce two
geographical dummies for European and Asian firms
(Europe and Asia), considering American firms as the
baseline.
Fourth, because firms announced their first OSS prod-
uct at different times and we observed their product
introductions only until December 2003, it is impor-
tant to control for a firm’s duration of presence in the
market (Hardin and Hilbe 2001). We build the variable
timeexposure, defined as the number of months elapsed
between a firm’s first OSS product introduction and the
end of the period (December 2003). We insert the log
of this variable in the second-step estimation with the
coefficient constrained to 1. This is equivalent to adding
a multiplicative factor TEi to the conditional mean
Eyi  xidi = 1= TEi · exp0+1x1i + · · · 
( · · ·
· · ·
)

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics
OPSYS n= 320 APP n= 213
Patentsoftware 12406 (80.428) 16845 (97.999)
Trademarksoftware 7031 (21.252) 9587 (25.629)
Trademarkhardware 4637 (14.610) 5727 (17.662)
Patenthardware 16347 (109.991) 21760 (132.811)
Size 10,636 (82,741.864) 7,927.07 (31,158.476)
Age76–85 0206 (0.405) 0221 (0.416)
Age86–94 0322 (0.468) 0380 (0.487)
Age95 035 (0.478) 0277 (0.449)
Specialization 0821 (0.278) 0791 (0.294)
Anteopsystem 0188 (0.391)
Anteapplication 0069 (0.253)
Dummy_ele 0041 (0.198) 0033 (0.179)
Dummy_soft 0609 (0.489) 0723 (0.449)
Dummy_hd 0241 (0.428) 0141 (0.349)
Dummy_tlc 0037 (0.190) 0052 (0.222)
Dummy_sem 0056 (0.231) 0009 (0.097)
Dummy_eu 0141 (0.348) 0127 (0.333)
Dummy_asia 0069 (0.253) 0042 (0.202)
Timeexposure 41656 (16.618) 41958 (20.733)
Source. Our elaborations are from Infotrac’s General Business File
ASAP and PROMT databases and from Bureau van Dijk’s Icarus,
Amadeus, and Jade databases.
Notes. Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses.
Dummy variables.
indicating the relative time of presence of each firm.
For the no-release firms, all variables are measured at
December 2003.
Table 3 provides the basic descriptive statistics for
the independent variables and controls, whereas Table 4
reports pairwise correlations.
Results
Table 5 shows the results of the second-step, nonlin-
ear least squares estimation, that is, the effect of our
variables on the number of OSS product introductions.
We discuss, first, the effect of a firm’s preexisting trade-
marks and patents on the number of product introduc-
tions in OPSYS. Next, we show that some differences
are observed in APP, and we propose a tentative expla-
nation for this finding.
A firm’s larger stock of preexisting software patents
enhances the number of OSS product releases. Thus,
as our first hypothesis conjectured, software patents
are complementary assets whose control increases the
appropriability of OSS products (Arora 1995). This find-
ing also suggests that software patents can be used as
bargaining chips to reduce potential hold-up problems
and/or to allow the firm to better control the evolution of
an OSS project (Ziedonis 2004, Mann 2006). Thus, soft-
ware patents, which may represent intellectual property
protection on other products or protection of components
of a product also containing some OSS code, are play-
ing an important role even within the OSS paradigm.
Holding all other variables at their mean value, our esti-
mated model predicts that doubling the number of soft-
ware patents with respect to the mean of patentsoftware
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Table 4 Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 Patentsoftware 1
2 Trademarksoftware 054 1
3 Trademarkhardware 055 052 1
4 Patenthardware 058 054 057 1
5 Size 022 024 026 028 1
6 Age76–85 009 012 000 −001 −003 1
7 Age86–94 −010 −012 −007 −007 −006 −029 1
8 Age95 −017 −017 −009 −009 −009 −040 −049 1
9 Specialization −015 −011 −005 −006 −006 −003 004 011 1
10 Anteopsystem 026 022 026 025 006 006 −001 −005 008 1
11 Anteapplication 023 017 023 023 010 005 −009 −005 005 025 1
12 Dummy_ele 014 016 003 006 011 −008 −001 −008 −003 001 001 1
13 Dummy_soft −014 −025 −011 −013 −015 −004 011 012 006 006 004 −025 1
14 Dummy_hd 007 017 010 009 000 007 −008 −004 −004 −005 −002 −011 −070 1
15 Dummy_tlc 009 006 003 004 001 −010 001 000 −002 −004 −001 −004 −025 −011 1
16 Dummy_sem 000 003 002 004 001 008 −007 −004 −001 −005 −009 −005 −031 −014 −005 1
17 Dummy_eu −008 −007 −004 −004 −003 002 007 −007 003 −008 −003 −004 009 −010 006 −002 1
18 Dummy_asia 007 013 002 005 007 −004 −005 −006 −005 −002 −001 023 −012 008 −002 −004 −011 1
would increase the number of OSS product introductions
by 47%.4
In line with our second hypothesis, the larger the
number of software trademarks, the lower the expected
number of OSS product introductions in OPSYS. Thus,
the threat of cannibalization plays an important role for
those firms that have invested heavily in proprietary soft-
ware brand name and reputation for quality. Holding all
Table 5 Nonlinear Least Squares Estimation (Second-Step Estimation; Corrected Standard Errors in Parentheses)
OPSYS APP
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Patentsoftware (Hypothesis 1) 0012∗∗ (0.002) 0012∗∗ (0.003) 0003∗∗ (0.001) 0002∗∗ (0.0008)
Trademarksoftware (Hypothesis 2) −0021∗∗ (0.005) −0012∗∗ (0.005) −0029∗∗ (0.009) −0017∗∗ (0.005)
Trademarkhardware (Hypothesis 3) 0041∗∗ (0.006) 0029∗∗ (0.009) 0024∗∗ (0.009) 0014∗ (0.007)
Patenthardware (Hypothesis 4) −0008∗∗ (0.002) −0007∗∗ (0.002) −0002 (0.002) −0001 (0.001)
Size 0124∗ (0.070) 0107 (0.708) 0232∗∗ (0.062) 0215∗∗ (0.040)
Age76–85 −0220 (0.336) 0193 (0.427) −0245 (0.423) 0011 (0.261)
Age86–94 0655∗ (0.360) 0732∗ (0.396) −0428 (0.384) −0238 (0.297)
Age95 −0028 (0.361) −0045 (0.437) −0164 (0.379) 0065 (0.320)
Specialization −0229 (0.685) −0611 (0.809) 0278 (0.446) −0113 (0.313)
Anteopsystem 0517∗∗ (0.112)
Anteapplication −1121∗∗ (0.499)
Sector Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes
Timeexposurea Yes Yes
Beta0 −4533∗∗ (1.232) −3722∗∗ (1.600) −4570∗∗ (0.909) −5084∗∗ (0.819)
Thetab 0304 (0.622) 0079 (0.962) −1136∗∗ (0.333) −0683∗∗ (0.255)
Log likelihood −845864 −839474 −333586 −324190
No. of observations 320 320 213 213
∗∗∗Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%.
Dummy variables.
aTime of exposure is defined as the number of months that elapsed between firm entry (first OSS product release) and the end of the
period (December 2003). It is used as a multiplicative factor to the conditional mean for the second-step estimations, i.e., it is used in log
with the coefficient constrained to 1.
bThe significant estimate for the covariance term  in the Applications niche reflects the presence of unobserved factors that are common
to the two decisions of a firm (whether to enter the OSS market and how many products to launch). Its negative sign shows that the average
number of product introductions would have been overestimated without a control for selectivity.
other variables at their mean value, doubling the num-
ber of software trademarks with respect to the mean
of trademarksoftware would reduce the number of OSS
product introductions by 11%.
The number of hardware trademarks shows a positive
and significant effect on the number of product intro-
ductions in OPSYS. This finding indicates that there
are complementarities between hardware and software,
Fosfuri, Giarratana, and Luzzi: The Commercialization of OSS Products
Organization Science 19(2), pp. 292–305, © 2008 INFORMS 301
and that firms that have invested in establishing a brand
name and reputation in hardware can benefit from com-
moditizing the software counterpart. Keeping all other
variables at their mean value, doubling the number of
hardware trademarks with respect to the mean of trade-
markhardware would increase the number of OSS prod-
uct introductions by 16%. This finding lends support to
Hypothesis 3.5
Finally, the negative coefficient of patenthardware—
significant only for the operating systems niche, and
not significant in some of the robustness checks we
describe—does not support our last hypothesis that legal
protection of hardware components helps to boost the
appropriability of OSS products. As a possible expla-
nation for this finding, we conjecture that firms with
strong technological specialization in hardware might
have fewer incentives to invest in software products due,
for instance, to fundamental differences in programming
languages between hardware and software engineers.
The results are similar for APP. Of particular interest
in this latter niche is the positive and highly significant
coefficient of the control variable anteopsystem, which
suggests that a key driver for the number of applications
released is whether a firm has previously launched an
operating system. We interpret this finding as evidence
of the patronizing strategy that some firms pursue: By
backing OSS applications, firms increase the value of
OSS operating systems. This picture is consistent with
the initial stage of the OSS market, where—lacking an
established and reliable set of application producers—
firms that want to launch operating systems are in some
way forced to release in-house applications to increase
the value and legitimacy of their OSS operating systems.
As to the other control variables, size has a posi-
tive coefficient in APP, but is not significant in OPSYS,
implying that the effects of scale are more important for
the applications. Age dummies and specialization do not
show significance, suggesting that experience and diver-
sification competences play a limited role.
Robustness Checks
We perform various robustness checks to validate our
findings. The results of these alternative regressions are
shown in Table 6. First, to ensure that our results are
robust regardless of the type of license scheme, we
run the regression only with product introductions that
are both open source and Linux-based (Model 1 in
Table 6). OSS products can be licensed under differ-
ent schemes that allow for different levels of openness
of the code. All Linux-based OSS products are licensed
under the same GNU-GPL scheme, which imposes the
burden of reciprocity. As we mentioned, these products
represent 87% and 88% of our sample of OSS prod-
uct introductions in OPSYS and APP, respectively. Sec-
ond, we perform the regression with only those product
announcements (about 65% of our whole sample) that
come from articles containing a product evaluation,
which implies that the journal’s reviewer has at least
seen the product prototype. This is likely to reduce
the problem of vaporware we mentioned (Model 2 in
Table 6). Third, we run the regression only for those
products that have both received an evaluation and are
licensed as GNU-GPL (Model 3 in Table 6). Fourth,
to check whether our findings are driven by outliers,
we exclude the three largest firms in terms of protected
intellectual property assets (IBM, Sun, and HP) from the
estimation (Model 4 in Table 6). The estimated coeffi-
cients remain fairly stable in all these robustness checks.
One result that is not robust is the significance of the
coefficient of trademarkhardware for APP. We believe
that this finding is consistent with the fact that applica-
tions need fewer linkages and synergies with hardware.
Finally, Model 5 in Table 6 shows the results with our
patent and trademark variables in log scale to check if
estimates are biased because of forced increasing returns
to scale. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
We also performed the following unreported robust-
ness checks, which are available upon request: (1) we
used age as a continuous variable; (2) we ran our regres-
sions only for U.S. firms because trademark and patent
variables are drawn from the U.S. Patent Office and,
therefore, are measured more precisely for this subset of
firms; (3) we pooled all product releases regardless of
the niche to which they belonged; (4) we scaled patent
and trademark counts directly by size; (5) we sequen-
tially excluded our core independent variables from the
estimation to test for multicollinearity biases. In all of
these cases, the results remained broadly consistent.
Discussion and Conclusions
Until recently, the OSS movement has been championed
by individuals, mostly software engineers and develop-
ers, with little firm participation. However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that firms have begun to take an in-
creasing commercial interest in OSS opportunities. This
paper accomplishes two goals. First, it provides novel
and comprehensive data on the commercialization of
OSS products. Second, it identifies some sources of het-
erogeneity in OSS product introductions across firms:
Variations in preexisting stocks of intellectual property
rights, namely patents and trademarks, help to explain
why some firms are taking more commercial actions
within the OSS paradigm than others. We have con-
firmed our hypotheses for a data set built on firms’
announcements of OSS product releases in the special-
ized press between 1995 and 2003.
Three results are worth summarizing. First, we find
that patents play an important role in appropriating the
returns from the commercialization of OSS products.
Firms with large stocks of software patents introduce
more OSS products. Our second finding points to the
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Table 6 Robustness Checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OPSYS APP OPSYS APP OPSYS APP OPSYS APP OPSYS APP
Patentsoftware (Hypothesis 1) 0011∗∗ 0003∗∗ 0015∗∗ 0003∗∗ 0014∗∗ 0004∗∗ 0011∗∗ 0003∗ 0499∗ 0159∗∗
0003 0001 0003 0001 0004 0000 0004 0001 0280 0048
Trademarksoftware (Hypothesis 2) −0018∗∗ −0016∗ −0018∗∗ −0016∗∗ −0021∗∗ −0017∗ −0009∗∗ −0007∗∗ −0756∗∗ −0351∗∗
0006 0009 0007 0004 0008 0009 0002 0003 0237 0072
Trademarkhardware (Hypothesis 3) 0031∗ 0018 0034∗∗ −0000 0033∗∗ −0019 0031∗∗ 0004 0451∗∗ 0149∗∗
0011 0012 0012 0016 0012 0012 0008 0012 0197 0044
Patenthardware (Hypothesis 4) −0006∗∗ −0002 −0009∗∗ −0000 −0008∗∗ −0002 −0008∗∗ −0005 0146 0018
0002 0002 0002 0001 0003 0002 0002 0005 0260 0045
Size 0102 0154∗ 0096 0156∗∗ 0097 0153∗∗ 0588 0144∗∗ 0200∗∗ 0427∗∗
0079 0078 0085 0056 0088 0068 0842 0085 0086 0117
Age76–85 −0332 0241 −0380 0474 −0610 0240 0574 0207 −0686∗ 0502∗∗
0544 0364 0609 0398 0704 0365 0771 0355 0387 0239
Age86–94 0781∗ 0121 0804 −0221 0739∗ 0120 0222 0188 0883∗∗ 0045
0404 0387 0452 0358 0452 0387 0365 0392 0447 0422
Age95 0101 0196 0023 0105 0010 0200 −0133 0442 0030 0862∗
0474 0336 0526 0294 0538 0337 0202 0414 0513 0461
Specialization −0671 0185 −0713 −0928 −0746 0184 −0986 −0939 0135 −1926∗∗
0881 0413 0946 0672 1001 0413 0900 0722 0822 0767
Anteopsystem 0527∗∗ 0425∗∗ 0526∗∗ 0493∗∗ 0506∗∗
0196 0158 0190 0101 0148
Anteapplication −1294∗∗ −1532∗∗ −1519∗∗ −0668∗∗ −0752∗∗
0583 0669 0694 0104 0258
Controls: Sector; Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Beta0 −3470∗ −5096∗∗ −3683∗ −3114∗∗ −3159 −5096∗∗ −2251∗∗ −2054∗∗ −5190∗∗ −8280∗∗
1914 0831 1997 0788 2339 0813 0777 0545 1317 1780
Theta −0100 −0437 00052 −0426 −0397 −0438 0054∗∗ −0400 0478 −1041∗∗
0869 0576 0994 0394 0964 0577 0004 0666 0701 0370
Log likelihood −810145 −289070 −822277 −215994 −812097 −289069 −801142 −284614 −863295 −37163
No. of observations 320 213 320 213 320 213 317 210 320 213
∗∗∗Significant at ∗10%, ∗∗5%.
Notes. Nonlinear least squares estimation (second-step estimation; corrected standard errors in parentheses).
potential cannibalization threat that OSS products exert
on proprietary software products. Firms with a large
portfolio of proprietary software trademarks fear the
devaluation of their brand name and reputation for qual-
ity if they straddle to OSS. Our third finding reinforces
the idea that complementarities are a key factor when
appropriability conditions are weakened (Teece 1986).
We show that firms with large stocks of hardware trade-
marks would benefit from OSS because it commodi-
tizes those portions of the value chain in which they do
not have a competitive advantage. Interestingly, we do
not find that such complementarities are present when
we analyze the stock of hardware patents. We conjec-
ture that the positive effect of complementarity can be
offset by the presence of fundamental differences in
programming languages between hardware and software
engineers.
Our findings generate some important implications
for managers and practitioners. First, OSS moves the
core of appropriability from code secrecy to the legal
protection of software technology, i.e., the protection
of an algorithm. Consequently, the technology core of
a software product will be less dependent on the code
writing ability that makes an algorithm executable, and
more dependent on owning and protecting the algorithm
that accomplishes a task best. This has important impli-
cations for firms that aim to exploit OSS opportunities
because they might need important investments in patent
protection as well. Most notably, small and young firms
with scant legal protection experience could be placed at
a disadvantage if they do not quickly realize the impor-
tance of formally protecting their core technologies.
Second, mixing open source approaches with propri-
etary assets and investments is the way for firms to profit
from commercializing OSS. This could be important not
only for large incumbents, but also for entrepreneurial
firms (see Gruber and Henkel 2006). An example of this
approach is Squeezebox, which, as we mentioned, mixes
OSS (the SlimServer) with patented software compo-
nents (some key codecs) and embeds the whole pack-
age with a proprietary hardware device. Although the
literature has suggested that mixing proprietary assets
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with OSS can enhance appropriability (see, for instance,
Dahlander and Magnusson 2005, Henkel 2006), our
work generalizes this finding to a large sample of OSS
products. We acknowledge, however, that because tight
control of intellectual property rights can discourage par-
ticipation of independent developers (Shah 2006), this
approach might not work well when OSS projects are in
their initial stages and require a great deal of contribu-
tion from the community.
Finally, our results highlight some implications for the
evolution of the value chain between software and hard-
ware if OSS continues to gain importance. If quickly
riding the gravy train is the straightforward conclusion
for hardware vendors, our suggestion to specialized soft-
ware suppliers is to shift their investments towards novel
selling channels, new relationships with customers, and
different marketing approaches according to the growth
of OSS markets. However, our findings suggest that this
change is particularly difficult for consolidated leaders
in the software industry. This also confirms the serious
potential threat that the OSS movement exerts on these
firms.
There are many important aspects of OSS commer-
cialization that we were unable to analyze in this paper.
One interesting research question that we did not ana-
lyze for lack of data is how firms use different strate-
gies to limit the amount of source code revealed in their
OSS products. The degree of openness would be an
important piece of information to elucidate how firms
profit from OSS products. Nor did we have extensive
information about the type of license under which the
software product was sold (although we have identi-
fied a subset of products licensed under GNU-GPL).
Such information could cast new light on firm busi-
ness model and commercialization strategies. Another
intriguing research question concerns the degree of
direct participation of firm employees in that commu-
nity, and the extent to which firms hire people from that
community. This analysis would help to better define the
interactions between firms and the OSS community of
users, practitioners, and developers (Lerner and Tirole
2005). It would also be helpful to understand how firms
resolve organizational challenges that arise from coordi-
nating commercial needs with the philosophy of the OSS
community, specifically, how firms coordinate and moti-
vate OSS contributors across multiple teams to establish
realistic goals and deadlines. Finally, we have tried to
understand empirical patterns emerging from the anal-
ysis of a large data set of secondary data. However, to
better assess the appropriateness and viability of differ-
ent business models based on the commercialization of
OSS products, one needs to rely on more micro and
detailed information. These, we believe, are all potential
avenues for future research.
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Appendix. Search Methods and Error Testing
We use two search algorithms for patents and trademarks to
construct algorithms that reduce the probability of not extract-
ing a correct hardware or software trademark or patent (to
reduce type II errors). For software patents, we search in the
patent abstract for the following string of words: [“computer
software” or “operating system” or “computer program” or
“software algorithm” or “data processing” or “software appli-
cation”]. For hardware patents, we search for the string [“com-
puter server” or “computer hardware” or “motherboard” or
“peripherals” or “workstation” or “mainframe” or “disk driver”
or “area network”]. For trademarks, we apply the same algo-
rithms (and same strings of words) to the text of the trademark
description of goods and services. To validate the accuracy of
the algorithms, we compared the results of our search with a
random sample of 200 patents and trademarks read and clas-
sified by a software engineer into software/no software or
hardware/no hardware patents and trademarks. Using a con-
servative approach, we selected the random sample inside the
general electronic technological and product classes, excluding
too-distant classes (like food, textiles, firearms, etc.). The error
percentages were as follows. From 107 nonsoftware patents,
the chosen algorithm spotted 23 patents (21.4%) as software
patents. From 93 software patents, 8 patents (8.6%) escaped
from the algorithm search. Similarly, from 84 nonsoftware
trademarks, 12 (14.2%) were included as software, and from
116 software trademarks, 9 (7.7%) escaped from the algo-
rithm search. For hardware, from 104 nonhardware patents, we
had 16 errors (15.3%), and from 96 hardware patents, we had
9 errors (9.3%). From 124 nonhardware trademarks, we had
18 errors (14.5%), and from 76 hardware trademarks, we had 6
errors (7.8%). As expected, errors for hardware are less severe
than for software, and errors in trademarks are less severe than
for patents. Overall, the error percentages are similar to those
of Bessen and Hunt (2007).
Endnotes
1Although all types of OSS licenses are required to make
available their source code, they might differ on the restric-
tions imposed on derivative works. At one end of the spec-
trum, copyleft licenses (for instance, the GNU–GPL) force
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subsequent programs to be licensed under the same condi-
tions. At the other extreme, noncopyleft licenses (for instance,
the Berkley Software Distribution (BSD) license) might allow
redistribution of derivative works under any license scheme be-
cause they impose no burden of reciprocity upon the licensee.
2These press announcements provide a measure of firm efforts
at commercializing OSS products. Although they do not allow
us to distinguish between investments in simply assembling
the product and investments in developing it, this distinction
does not represent a serious concern for the arguments pro-
posed in our hypotheses.
3The standard way to model heterogeneity in the Poisson
model is to respecify the unconditional distribution for yi as a
negative binomial (hypothesizing the error term 	i in the con-
ditional Poisson distribution of yi  	i to have a gamma 1 
distribution). A normal error term is used here because the
standard formulation does not permit addressing the missing
zero problem (Terza 1998).
4Because we are estimating a count model, this means specifi-
cally that doubling the number of software patents with respect
to the mean would imply a predicted change in the number of
OSS product introductions from 1.89 to 2.77.
5These counterfactual increases in the core independent vari-
ables represent quite conventional means for measuring their
size effect on the dependent variable according to the estima-
tion model. They are meant to give a broad idea of the results
of an experiment that might be unfeasible in reality, given the
nature of firm resources (Barney 1991). It is also important to
note that our independent variables show high standard devia-
tions within our sample.
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